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Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$91.76
107.72
102.85
155.68
51.73
54.45
57.28
97.62
265.39
$82.14
99.39
97.15
135.29
49.61
       *
55.35
91.50
244.07
$83.16
102.78
93.55
139.94
52.58
        *
57.70
94.37
242.30
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.16
3.75
8.83
4.91
2.10
4.06
3.54
9.57
5.57
2.36
4.38
3.61
9.52
6.11
2.62
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
202.50
77.50
75.00
138.50
48.00
       *
82.50
       *
112.50
39.00
        *
82.50
        *
122.50
41.75
*No Market
To successfully compete in today’s globalized
economy, agribusiness firms need to innovate.
Innovation enables firms to produce new and/or
differentiated products/services that satisfy specialized
consumer demands, and enables firms to generate cost
reducing processes to out-compete rivals in domestic
and international food markets. Firms will engage in
innovative activities if they are able to recoup research
and development (R&D) costs and capture innovation
rents, so it is critical that they are able to identify the
optimal strategies of protecting and profiting from
their innovations. 
Patenting is the strongest form of protection,
granting exclusive rights over a limited period of time;
but not always resulting in the highest possible
payoffs. Patents can be challenged after being granted,
either via a direct validity attach and/or via
infringement. Patent litigation can be very costly, with
the average litigation cost (including the cost of
discovery), exceeding $3 million per side and typically
taking two to three years to litigate (Hsieh 2006). In
addition, the outcome of the trial may be unfavorable
for the patentee. In fact, more than 45 percent of
patents are revoked during infringement trials (Allison
and Lemley 1998), while 75 percent of the patents
which are directly challenged end up being revoked or
amended (Barton 2000). During 2002-2004 the lawsuit
loss rate for patent owners at the appellate level was
75.6 percent (Janicke and Ren 2006). 
So when should firms patent their innovations and
when should they choose trade secrecy? If the decision
to patent is made, how broad should the protection
claimed be? When should firms litigate under
infringement and when should they license their
patents? While there are a number of theoretical
studies that have tried to address the above questions, 
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empirical research that tests theoretical findings and
predictions and could offer new insights into the
factors that affect patenting behavior is very limited.
This is mainly due to the fact that the usefulness of
patent data as a means of empirically analyzing
patenting behavior and understanding the patenting
decision-making process is limited. One can only
observe the ex-post decisions (whether the innovation
has been patented or not, licensed or not, or whether
a trial has taken place or not), and not the decision-
making process itself. Economic experiments allow
for empirical analysis without such problems.
Economic experiments make use of human subjects to
test, refine or develop economic theories by allowing
researchers to set-up controlled situations where
specific factors of interest (such as the patenting
decisions) can be examined without conflicting
variables present. The actions of the subjects can then
be analyzed to understand their decision-making
process and can also be directly compared to the
predictions of theory.
Two economics experiments were developed by
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of
Agricultural Economics, to shed light into the
decision to license a patented innovation. The
experiments were conducted in the "Experimental and
Behavioral Economics Laboratory" (EBEL) in Filley
Hall on East Campus, with undergraduate students,
pursuing different majors at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln, being used as subjects. 
The first experiment examined whether, when the
decision to license is made, the patent holder
maximizes profits, or her/his strategy is to maintain a
dominant market share and whether, as suggested by
theoretical studies, patentees license to weak rather
than strong rivals. In this experiment each subject
assumed the role of an innovator/patentee who faced
two types of virtual entrants: weak and strong. Two
scenarios were developed that differed with respect to
the number of firms allowed to enter the industry; in
the first scenario, the rival that did not receive a
license stayed out of the market, while in the second
scenario this rival could enter the market with a given
likelihood. The first scenario was designed to capture
the choice between profits and market share. The
second scenario was designed to examine how the
likelihood of entry by the non-licensed rival affects
the innovator’s licensing decision, and whether the
subjects’ choice is affected by the way they receive
information about market structure, i.e., information
is given sequentially as decisions are made versus
information is given ex ante, before decisions are
made. 
Sixty undergraduate students participated in this
non-interactive experiment, and results showed that
the assumptions of profit maximization and licensing
to weak competitors did not always hold. The outcome
was very much dependent on the assumptions made
about the potential licensee (e.g., their type and
whether they would enter the market in the absence of
a license or not). Results showed that the subjects that
used licensing to maximize profits (rather than market
share), chose strong rather than weak competitors as
potential licensees, and that the way information was
received significantly affected the licensing decision;
the likelihood of choosing profits over market share
was higher when the information was given ex ante,
compared to sequentially as decisions were made.
The second experiment examined (a) whether
patentees are more likely to license broad versus
narrow  patents (economic theory suggests that broad
patents are more likely to be licensed), and (b) the
likelihood of patent licensing, patent infringement and
patent litigation, given the nature of the potential
entrant (weak vs. strong). This was an interactive
choice experiment where subjects participated in a
series of games (strategic interactions), where they
were randomly paired up and assumed the role of an
innovator/patentee or a potential entrant. Each game
simulated specific market conditions to allow for
comparison of the results among various market
structures, and each decision was associated with a
given payoff so that the subjects’ decisions in each
game determined their overall payoffs. The questions
of interest were examined under six different scenarios
(sub-experiments) that determined whether the
licensing outcome is affected by (a) the nature of the
bargaining process during which the licensing fee is
determined (one shot game versus multiple
interactions); (b) who initiates the bargaining process,
the patentee or the potential entrant; and (c) whether
the players had complete versus incomplete
information. 
Ninety-six undergraduate students participated in
this interactive experiment, and the results showed that
the likelihood of licensing was affected by the breadth
of the patent in a manner consistent with theoretical
predictions; broad patents were more likely to be
licensed than narrow ones. Also, the likelihood of
licensing was greater under incomplete information,
where innovators were more likely to license to weak
rivals. However, contrary to theoretical findings, under
complete information innovators were more likely to
license to strong rivals. The likelihood of patent
challenge was greater for broad rather than narrow
patents, and weak rivals were more likely to challenge
patents than strong rivals. Also, a patent was more
likely to be challenged when no licensing offer was
made. Finally, the likelihood of patent litigation was
smaller for broad rather than narrow patents, and inno-
vators were more likely to litigate infringed patents when they faced a strong rather than a weak competitor and
when they, rather than the potential entrants, initiated the licensing process. 
While most of the results from the above experiments conform with theoretical predictions, a few contest
theoretical findings and give new insights on the factors affecting patent licensing behavior (e.g., the effect of the
type of entrant on the likelihood of patent challenge and patent litigation). To further investigate the inconsistency
between theoretical predictions and empirical findings, these first results will be used to fine tune the experiments
and run them using real life innovators as subjects. 
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